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B. A. Friedman

This is definitely cope, but the depletion of stocks isn’t even the biggest problem. The problem is that fires, or strike warfare if you will, is inherently indecisive.

Aron Lund

Michaels O’Hanlon and Poznansky, of @brookings.edu, do not see the depletion of U.S. missile stocks as a problem vis-à-vis China. www.brookings.edu/articles/why...

Обсуждение

7 прямых ответов · 48 сообщений

Islay Scotch Socialist

"China should be worried about how badly the US degraded Irans military" Amigo, it has barely moved the needle on the ONE thing Iran can do to really hurt us, which is interference with shipping traffic.

Ответ для Islay Scotch Socialist
Tarpeian Socialist

Incidentally, this is also one of if not the biggest Chinese concern lmao

Ответ для Tarpeian Socialist
Tarpeian Socialist

Everyone yappin' about blowing shit up but it's the moving shit around that matters most

VictorK

This is a political problem and I wonder if it has a political solution. As you say this has been obvious for decades. But the President has this vast, powerful military, and although bombing campaigns have shown themselves to be useless against the enemy, they are important for domestic politics.

Ответ для VictorK
VictorK

Think back to Trump I, when the press gushed about Trump's inconsequential bombing of Syria - someone said it was the moment he actually became President. So we have a situation where the primary method of US-war making, the precision bombing campaign, is useless but also essential.

Ответ для VictorK
VictorK

A President is not a President unless they wield the commander-in-chief power to bomb people overseas for high cost and no result. The only solution is political-the reassertion of limits on Presidential warmaking. Unfortunately I think we'll need a disaster like China kicking our ass to get there.

Marshall

the collective will of contemporary humanity appears to be directed towards degrading ourselves until we no longer have the ability to resist it's one thing The Nations cooperate on very effectively

never linger; rightly grow

couldn't iran's control of the strait of hormuz be described as strike warfare as well

Ответ для never linger; rightly grow
B. A. Friedman

No, because they’re also employing mines, fast attack craft, and a range of other capabilities. Strike warfare is important, but it works in concert with other capabilities, not as a replacement.

B. A. Friedman

A core assumption of U.S. defense strategy since the early 1990’s has been that as the precision-strike regime matures, greater precision will make fires decisive. csbaonline.org/resource/the...

The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment - CSBAcsbaonline.org
Ответ для B. A. Friedman
B. A. Friedman

In theory, this was seen as impossible. Indeed Clausewitz said it was in about 1812 in one of his earlier works.

Ответ для B. A. Friedman
B. A. Friedman

But that assumption that greater precision will lead to decisiveness is failing in practice all around us. Yet the entire strategy of denial is built on it: destroy enough of the PLA with long-range fires and they’ll throw up their hands and stop trying to invade Taiwan. That’s the whole idea.

Ответ для B. A. Friedman
B. A. Friedman

O’Hanlon and Poznansky are right but not in the way they think: the depletion of munitions doesn’t matter for China because the entire strategy of denial is built on a false assumption. The actual numbers of munitions doesn’t matter at all.

Ответ для B. A. Friedman
Hank

Rank amateur here, so I’m trying to make sure I’m clear: doesn’t matter AT ALL at all? Or “you can lose if you don’t have enough, but you can never have enough to win the war for you”?

Ответ для Hank
B. A. Friedman

Yeah the latter. No matter how many missiles you lob at the invasion it's not going to solve the problem.

Ответ для B. A. Friedman
Karl

I saw Nagorno-Karabakh as a lesson that drones will hit and destroy every military target of value. This was proven false a couple years later in Ukraine. Drone warfare has done it's damage but it hasn't stopped either Army from keeping forces in the field or stopped their warmaking capabilities.

Ответ для B. A. Friedman
Clay Copper

Any readings you'd recommend on an alternative theory of denial?

Ответ для Clay Copper
Obliviousness

Yes, inquiring minds would like to know

Ответ для Clay Copper
Vlad Oligarchsky
Ответ для Vlad Oligarchsky
Clay Copper

😅

Ответ для Clay Copper
B. A. Friedman

I think the denial framing itself is bad. But I haven't really seen anyone writing on alternatives.

Ответ для B. A. Friedman
Christo Silvia

I disagree with this - strike warfare and fires absolutely do work and are decisive ... in air and naval warfare, which would be a ton of any Taiwan contingency. The US's error has been to try to apply strike warfare to ground warfare and political warfare

Ответ для Christo Silvia
Christo Silvia

Also, strike warfare can deny the use of a region to the enemy, but not necessarily secure it, which is something that would be helpful in a Taiwan contingency

Ответ для Christo Silvia
Thomas

We're seeing it from Iran right now

Ответ для B. A. Friedman
Ответ для B. A. Friedman
B. A. Friedman

I generally use it to mean the achievement of a strategic effect (which comes from Colin S. Gray's work, especially The Strategy Bridge). Strike warfare certainly has tactical outcomes. These do not necessarily lead to strategic effect, as we're seeing in the Iran conflict now.

Ответ для B. A. Friedman
Éamann Mac Donnchada

agree with all but I see a tendency among some commentators to deny even tactictal effect. The US/Israel blows up an important installation. Ha! Ha! Ha! the Iranians will build another in no time etc, this logic is never applied to Ukr's strikes on Russia

Ответ для B. A. Friedman
Bram De Ridder

Wouldn´t Ukraine´s current strikes be a potential counterpoint, where strategic effect is achieved (under caveat)?

Ответ для Bram De Ridder
B. A. Friedman

No, because their strike warfare is in combination with other forms. It's not being used independently.

Ответ для B. A. Friedman
Bram De Ridder

Thanks!

Ответ для B. A. Friedman
davidbofinger

Some of the depleted weapons (Tomahawk, to some extent 155mm) are deep strike. So they don't generally have a lot of tactical effects. They're more likely to be about attrition, or disruption of large scale functions like wide area air defence.

Ответ для davidbofinger
B. A. Friedman

All of those are tactical effects.

Ответ для B. A. Friedman
Kampf mit Kette

Decisive is what I insist via mirror imaging it is

Ответ для B. A. Friedman
Not Particularly Anonymous

Might it actually apply to Taiwan? If you take out the physical ships and aircraft PLA needs to invade or enforce a blockade? Or does it just devolve into both sides endlessly lobbing missiles and drones at each other?

Ответ для B. A. Friedman
Kampf mit Kette
Anomaly of the East

It's beyond cope, the author has absolutely no idea what's going on within the Standing Committee, the dude doesn't understand what is deterrence to begin with. You don't deter anything when there is no intent.

Gigan, Therapod Enthusiast

The stocks isn’t the part that worries me most from a budget standpoint either, though I haven’t read their arguement yet, but it’s the overall stress on the force and the wear on platforms and maintenance backlog it’s causing

Ответ для Gigan, Therapod Enthusiast
Gigan, Therapod Enthusiast

That we feel it’s necessary to look at restarting the C17 line to ensure sustainment of the air wing bodes poorly for the budget opportunity costs on what we miss out on investing more in to sustain what we already have now

Ответ для Gigan, Therapod Enthusiast
Gigan, Therapod Enthusiast

Plus the political costs of this are kind of under discussed. It took a big political lift to get the plus up we have now and the admin took that check and lit it on fire so they could attempt regime change on a lark. Why would I feel compelled to give more money if it’s going to be wasted like this

Ответ для Gigan, Therapod Enthusiast
B. A. Friedman

Oh yeah the enablers piece always gets ignored.

Ответ для Gigan, Therapod Enthusiast
Empty Bag of Ducks📎

The one thing I learned about airframes and vessels, is that as they age (in terms of years or service hours) is eventually you hit the knee in the curve where the cost to maintain them skyrockets and no amount of additional maintenance funds appreciably improves readiness/availabilty

Ответ для Empty Bag of Ducks📎
Empty Bag of Ducks📎

The bigger indictment is the AF has known for years the C17 was well ahead of its life cycle model and refused to budget/start work on its replacement.

Ответ для Empty Bag of Ducks📎
Gigan, Therapod Enthusiast

Right, we have the NGAL off in the future but the wear on the C17 fleet from this war might mean that we either need to accelerate the NGAL or extend the C17 operational lifecycle. And that gets to my point, that’s a new expense we which was unplanned and will need to fight for space in the budget

Ответ для Gigan, Therapod Enthusiast
Empty Bag of Ducks📎

You are spot on. The tanker fleet is in even worse shape. I sat through enough Service 3 star programmer level discussions and final POM presentations to appreciate the hard choices that have to be made, but kicking the can on power projection/logistics was unconscionable

Ответ для Empty Bag of Ducks📎
Gigan, Therapod Enthusiast

Burning bonfires of sage to keep evil spirits away from Boeing’s Everett plant for no further delays on KC-46 deliveries

Ответ для Empty Bag of Ducks📎
Oberst Wilhelm Klink | Alfredo Yu

At present (and because of the current Gangsterregierung), the US Armed Forces are not suited for a peer-to-peer conflict. And YES, our armed forces (compared to 14(!!!) divisions we had in the late 90s) are also f00ked up. 🙄

Ответ для Oberst Wilhelm Klink | Alfredo Yu
Empty Bag of Ducks📎

I’m a Cold Warrior, we had 28 divisions in 1988. 18 active, 10 National Guard

Ответ для Empty Bag of Ducks📎