Профиль

This should be widely read. The readers can make the judgement themselves. www.nytimes.com/2026/07/28/b...

Thank you to everyone who has liked and reposted the fundraiser ❤️

Yes, that's what I mean. They need to be coupled with something else. Just blasting away doesn't move the strategic needle.

All of those are tactical effects.

Obviously, I'm a big fan of Ukraine's work in the killing Russians genre, but I think we should keep in mind they started the war using Russian doctrine and the lessons learned from that starting position may not be totally applicable to others. (The first lesson being don't use Russian doctrine).

Odysseus sailed across the Mountain Dew Baja Blast dark sea.

I wonder if they did any PME on all the battles where the IJN beat Russian and Chinese navies like they owed them money.

No, because their strike warfare is in combination with other forms. It's not being used independently.

I generally use it to mean the achievement of a strategic effect (which comes from Colin S. Gray's work, especially The Strategy Bridge). Strike warfare certainly has tactical outcomes. These do not necessarily lead to strategic effect, as we're seeing in the Iran conflict now.

This begs the question: what is decisiveness anyway? There's no agreed upon definition. People just say it.

I think the denial framing itself is bad. But I haven't really seen anyone writing on alternatives.

Yeah the latter. No matter how many missiles you lob at the invasion it's not going to solve the problem.

Oh yeah the enablers piece always gets ignored.

O’Hanlon and Poznansky are right but not in the way they think: the depletion of munitions doesn’t matter for China because the entire strategy of denial is built on a false assumption. The actual numbers of munitions doesn’t matter at all.

But that assumption that greater precision will lead to decisiveness is failing in practice all around us. Yet the entire strategy of denial is built on it: destroy enough of the PLA with long-range fires and they’ll throw up their hands and stop trying to invade Taiwan. That’s the whole idea.

In theory, this was seen as impossible. Indeed Clausewitz said it was in about 1812 in one of his earlier works.

A core assumption of U.S. defense strategy since the early 1990’s has been that as the precision-strike regime matures, greater precision will make fires decisive. csbaonline.org/resource/the...

This is definitely cope, but the depletion of stocks isn’t even the biggest problem. The problem is that fires, or strike warfare if you will, is inherently indecisive.

My latest in @warontherocks.bsky.social. "The First Waves of Amphibious Assault Will Be Unmanned." warontherocks.com/the-first-wa...

Sorry to be that guy but also the U.S. can stop making the same mistakes over and over anytime it wants please.