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Merci à Quentin Lafay pour son accueil dans "Questions du soir" sur @franceculture.fr! Au menu, l'érosion de la démocratie et les remèdes proposés avec @pierrecboyer.bsky.social dans notre note du @caeeco.bsky.social: cae-eco.fr/face-a-lesso.... Le replay: www.radiofrance.fr/francecultur...

Faut-il changer les règles du jeu démocratique? C'est le sujet de notre nouvelle note @caeeco.bsky.social avec @pierrecboyer.bsky.social. J'en ai débattu hier sur @bfmbusiness.bsky.social avec @raveaudgilles.bsky.social. Replay: www.bfmtv.com/economie/rep... Note: cae-eco.fr/face-a-lesso...

On ne peut pas tout traiter en 12 pages :) Mais les chiffres qu'on donne sur la défiance envers différentes institutions sont en effet un argument en faveur d'une plus forte décentralisation.

Je publie aujourd’hui, au @caeeco.bsky.social, une note coécrite avec @pierrecboyer.bsky.social : « Face à l’essoufflement démocratique, réformer les institutions ». Lien vers la note: cae-eco.fr/face-a-lesso...

Chaque nouvelle candidature réduit les chances de battre le RN. Ma dernière chronique pour @lesechosfr.bsky.social 👇👇

Check out the April 2026 issue (24,2) of @jeeanews.bsky.social Journal of @eeanews.bsky.social Teaching materials available: www.eeassoc.org/teaching-mat... academic.oup.com/jeea/issue

Heurs et malheurs de l'IA en politique. Ma dernière chronique pour @lesechosfr.bsky.social 👇👇

Democracy and business are often treated as separate domains. Instead, in a new piece for @mitsmr.bsky.social, Julie Battilana, Lakshmi Ramarajan, Matthew Lee and I argue that business leaders have a rational interest—not just a civic duty—in defending democracy. sloanreview.mit.edu/article/why-...

Merci @alietteh.bsky.social pour son invitation cette semaine dans "Entendez-vous l'éco" sur @franceculture.fr! 👇 Que peut nous apprendre l’économie sur les élections? Peut-on penser la politique comme un marché? La main invisible y opère-t-elle? 🎧A écouter ici: www.radiofrance.fr/francecultur...

De l'autocratie - et de la résistance - en Amérique. Ma dernière chronique pour @lesechosfr.bsky.social 👇👇

Thanks! The effects are smaller in the more recent period:

This definition allows us to also consider parl elections that do not lead to the designation of the head of government (e.g., in the U.S.). But as part of our ongoing revisions we will consider also an alternative definition where the outcome is one if the party controls the government.

Full paper on our websites: drive.google.com/file/d/1pMj5...; www.vincentpons.org/global-incum...; vrollet.github.io/files/Incumb... (n/n).

Finally, the national-level incumbency advantage has generally fallen over the past decades: despite democratic backsliding, incumbents do not seem increasingly entrenched (12/n).

For instance, in the least democratic countries in our sample, only 56% of elections are followed by another election held on schedule; 17% are followed by a late election or by no election at all (11/n).

In less democratic settings, the incumbency advantage largely stems from manipulating the fairness and timing of follow-up elections (10/n).

Indeed, similar incumbency advantages can reflect very different mechanisms. In established democracies, incumbency mainly helps through better performance in follow-up elections that are free and fair (9/n).

The contrast with the subnational evidence is striking. At the subnational level, incumbency advantage is strongest in richer and more democratic settings. At the national level, it is large in both the most democratic and the least democratic countries (8/n).

This average effect hides major regional differences. The national incumbency advantage is large in Western Europe/North America (+26pp) and Africa (+42pp) but muted or negative in Latin America and Asia/Oceania (7/n).

On average, winning a national election raises the probability of still being in power after the scheduled end of term by 10pp on average, but this effect is short-lived (6/n).