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I am one of the very few who has told Vladimir Putin to his face exactly what I think about corruption at the highest levels of government. A month later I faced criminal charges — and was locked up for more than ten years. Follow here and on Substack for more: blog.khodorkovsky.com

How to Slay a Dragon | Mikhail Khodorkovsky | SubstackRussia, geopolitics, and the fight for what comes after Putin. Click to read How to Slay a Dragon, by Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a Substack publication with thousands of subscribers.blog.khodorkovsky.com

Tariffs may weaken Putin over time. They will not, by themselves, stop the war. The real pressure will come from two things: 1. Sustained military support for Ukraine. 2. The widening gap between what Europe can produce and what Russia can still afford. [15/15]

China is unlikely to increase its involvement enough to compensate fully for that shift. But this does not mean Ukraine can simply fight on until it defeats Putin outright. Ukraine faces a severe shortage of manpower — it cannot sacrifice its future indefinitely. [14/15]

Europe spent years moving too slowly. But its defense industry is now gaining momentum. If the war continues for another year or two, the balance is likely to shift increasingly against Russia in: – ammunition – drones – intelligence capabilities [13/15]

The more important factor is military support for Kyiv. Ukrainian and European defense production is expanding, while Russia's economic and industrial resources are being steadily depleted. [12/15]

Sanctions can still raise costs, create shortages and accelerate Russia's technological decline. What they cannot do is switch off Putin's war machine quickly. [11/15]

More likely, tariffs will become another subject for negotiation with China rather than a weapon used decisively enough to force it out of Russia's economic orbit. And if China is not removed from the equation, the rest of the sanctions architecture is important — but secondary. [10/15]

New tariff powers may please the White House, because they create additional leverage. But leverage is not the same as a willingness to use it — and to risk a full economic confrontation with Beijing. [9/15]

By comparison, the war in Ukraine is a far smaller issue for the US government. It involves significant spending and relations with European allies — but it does not determine the global balance of power the way the US–China relationship does. [8/15]

That region is, for America, three things at once: – a vast market for its products – a crucial source of goods for its consumers – an essential supplier of raw materials [7/15]

For Washington, the relationship with China is a strategic issue of an entirely different order. It is about which power will dominate the Asia-Pacific — a region where nearly 5 billion people live. [6/15]

The real question is whether the US is genuinely prepared to inflict major damage on its own trade with China in order to pressure Beijing over the war in Ukraine. I have serious doubts. [5/15]

China is by far the more important of the two. A substantial share of Putin's military capacity now depends on one thing: continued economic relations with Beijing. [4/15]

Both are independent enough to make their own decisions rather than follow Washington's lead. Today they are Russia's principal oil customers — and vital suppliers of goods the Russian economy can no longer easily obtain elsewhere. [3/15]

There is no sanctions mechanism that can directly stop Putin's war. Sanctions weaken the regime — but they work over years, not weeks. And their effect depends above all on what two countries decide: China and India. [2/15]

Learn more about the issue and the population trends in Russia and Ukraine from this by Sergey Aleksashenko and Aby Shukiurov for NEST: nestcentre.org/russia-and-u...

Russia and Ukraine facing depopulation: Рrospects for demographic recovery after the war – New Eurasian Strategies CentreRussia and Ukraine are facing long-term depopulation, and the response to this challenge is the recruitment of migrants, primarily from Central Asia.nestcentre.org

Yet he calls this a war for the Russian nation. Its clearest result is to accelerate that nation's decline through the men it kills at the front and the men it drives out of the country. [7/7]

Putin inherited low birth rates, an ageing population, and men who die young. His war makes every part of it worse — there are more young men dead and will be fewer children born. [6/7]

The numbers were already regressing: Russia's working-age population is projected to fall by 10 to 12 million by 2046, with the total population dropping to around 140 million. The war deepens both. [5/7]

Russia's birth rate was already far below what the population needs. In 2020–2025 the total fertility rate fell to about 1.4. To keep a population stable, the figure has to be around 2.15. [4/7]